Impact of Top Management\u27s IT Knowledge and IT Governance Mechanisms on Financial Performance by Boritz, Efrim & Lim, Jee-Hae
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 2007 Proceedings International Conference on Information Systems(ICIS)
December 2007
Impact of Top Management's IT Knowledge and






Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2007
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 2007 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Boritz, Efrim and Lim, Jee-Hae, "Impact of Top Management's IT Knowledge and IT Governance Mechanisms on Financial
Performance" (2007). ICIS 2007 Proceedings. 88.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2007/88
Twenty Eighth International Conference on Information Systems, Montreal 2007 1
IMPACT OF TOP MANAGEMENT’S IT KNOWLEDGE  
AND IT GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS  
ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
J. Efrim Boritz 
UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO 
SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTANCY 
200 UNIVERSITY AVE W (BFG 2116) 
WATERLOO ON N2L 3G1 
PHONE: (519) 888-4567 (X35774) 
FAX: (519) 888-4314 
JEBORITZ@UWATERLOO.CA
Jee-Hae Lim 
UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO 
SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTANCY 
200 UNIVERSITY AVE W (BFG 2123) 
WATERLOO ON N2L 3G1 
PHONE: (519) 888-4567 (X35702) 




The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether top management’s IT knowledge and the firm’s use of 
important IT governance mechanisms reliably contribute to a firm’s financial performance. We found that IT 
knowledge at top executive levels and the board is associated with a company’s use of IT governance mechanisms 
such as CIOs and IT strategy committees that lead to improved financial performance. These findings provide 
evidence-based support for normative prescriptions for addressing the so-called IT attention and IT knowledge 
deficits at the top executive and board levels of companies.  
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Introduction  
IT governance focuses on adding value through effective investments in IT. The two key mechanisms by which such 
value can be realized is through the alignment of IT strategy with an entity’s business strategy and effective 
management of the portfolio of an entity’s IT investments.  IT investments represent a significant portion (about 
50%) of the capital investments made by today’s business entities and public sector organizations, averaging 4% of 
revenues, according to Weill and Ross (2004). Therefore, effective IT governance is thought to be a critical factor in 
contributing to an entity’s success as measured by its financial performance and, for public companies, their market 
value. 
The primary objective of this research is to examine whether top management’s IT knowledge and the firm’s use of 
important IT governance mechanisms reliably contribute to a firm’s financial performance. If they do, then 
normative prescriptions for addressing the so-called attention and knowledge deficits in company boardrooms would 
rest on more solid, evidence-based foundations.  Business leaders could be more certain that investments in IT 
knowledge and IT governance mechanisms would pay off and would be spurred to remedy the IT knowledge and 
attention deficits documented in previous research. 
Our main objective is to test the following proposition: Financial performance for companies whose top executives 
and board members have IT knowledge and who employ high level IT governance mechanisms will be higher 
than the financial performance of similar companies without these characteristics. 
Background  
IT investments are known to affect capital market perceptions of an entity’s future potential and hence the value that 
the capital markets places on companies making such investments. Indeed, several indicators of strategic use of IT 
by an entity have been found to impact investors’ assessments of company value, including investments in ERP 
systems (Hayes et al. 2001; Ranganathan and Brown 2006), new appointments of CIOs (Chatterjee et al. 2001) and 
announcements of major outsourcing contracts (Hayes et al. 2000; Oh et al. 2006).  
However, there is limited evidence in the public domain on the contribution of key IT governance factors to 
company value. Kambil and Lucas (2002) suggest that IT knowledge at the board level can make corporate 
management aware of technology trends and help integrate IT with corporate strategy. However, little research has 
focused on the value of top management and Board involvement in IT governance (Mahring, 2006). The extant 
literature portrays a deficit of IT knowledge at the top of companies and an absence of interest in IT governance 
(Burson-Marsteller 2005; Huff et al. 2006). 
Our research aims to assess whether IT knowledge and IT governance mechanisms, where they exist, are associated 
with a firm’s financial performance. If they do, then normative prescriptions would rest on more solid foundations.  
Business leaders could be more certain that investments in IT knowledge and IT governance mechanisms would pay 
off. 
Hypotheses Development 
Board level IT governance is prescribed by normative publications such as the IT Governance Institute’s (ITGI 
2003) Board Briefing on IT Governance (BBIG) and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 20 Questions 
Directors should ask about IT (CICA 2004).  These normative views see IT governance as a board level initiative 
that leads to the alignment of IT strategy with the firm’s overall business strategy and effective management of the 
firm’s portfolio of investments in IT.  These two goals are achieved through a number of governance mechanisms 
including structures, processes and relational mechanisms (De Haes and Van Grembergen 2005).  However, 
descriptive research on current practices suggests that IT governance practices at the board level are not nearly as 
well developed as the prescriptions imply.  
Buckby et al. (2005) and Mahring (2006) summarize the literature on the role of boards in IT governance.  The 
literature points to both a knowledge deficit (Burson-Marsteller 2005) and an attention deficit at the board level 
(Huff et al. 2006).  CIOs seem to be interested in IT governance but their higher ups do not seem to share these 
convictions.  Where CIOs do, they interpret IT governance as compliance with regulatory requirements and 
maintaining business continuity (PwC 2006; Huff et al. 2006).  
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Although the research on current practice paints a dismal picture of the state of IT governance, especially at the 
board level, at the same time, some companies have established IT governance mechanisms such as IT strategy 
committees (E&Y 2006).  The ITGI (2003) views the IT strategy committee as a key mechanism for implementing 
board-level IT governance.  Admittedly, the number of companies that have adopted such practices is small and the 
question is whether those that have adopted them have benefited. Another key mechanism is a high ranking CIO.  
Thus, we hypothesize that IT knowledge on the part of board members and top level executives facilitates the 
creation and effective use of such mechanisms. 
A PricewaterhouseCoopers study on IT Governance in Practice (PwC 2006) notes that the benefits of IT 
Governance are often not measured and are difficult to quantify.  Weill and Ross (2004) assert that IT governance is 
associated with significantly improved corporate performance in terms of Profitability, Asset Utilization and 
Growth.  However, Weill and Ross do not provide empirical data to support their conclusions and their IT 
governance ratings are composites of numerous indicators, making it difficult to assess the impact of specific 
mechanisms. This study aims to investigate the performance improvements that are specifically associated with IT 
knowledge at the board level and the executive suite and the use of IT governance mechanisms such as the IT 
strategy committee and the CIO.   
IT knowledge of board of directors  
Board level IT governance has a poor chance of being implemented and being effective if board members don’t pay 
attention to IT due to a lack of appreciation for its strategic significance. Some researchers have identified an 
attention deficit and a knowledge deficit at the board. For example, Huff et al. (2006) report on case studies of 17 
Canadian companies in two different sectors where IT governance knowledge and activity are virtually absent at the 
board level.  Jordan and Musson (2004) provide a similar set of findings in an Australian e-commerce context.  
Burson-Marsteller (2005) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC 2006) provide similar findings for the US and 
internationally, respectively. De Haes and Van Grembergen (2005) note that the board works at a very high level 
and is not involved in IT governance. However, a Deloitte and Corporate Board Member (2006) survey reports that 
its respondent board members do pay attention to IT. Following the suggestion by Kambil and Lucas (2002) we 
hypothesize that IT knowledge at the board level is an antecedent of effective IT governance at the board level and 
lower levels in the organization.  
IT knowledge of top executives 
In this study, top executive refers to members of the top management team, including the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), the Chief Operating Officer (COO), and other senior business executives 
responsible for key business or functional areas, but excluding the Chief Information Officer (CIO).  Through a 
variety of rich case studies, McKenney et al. (1995) document the critical role of senior management in facilitating 
the use of IT in firms well-known for their IT governance success. An IT-literate business management is also 
regarded as vital (Keen 1991; Boynton et al. 1994).  Some surveys suggest that many Boards view IT governance as 
a management function and leave this activity to management. We hypothesize that IT knowledge is an antecedent 
to effective IT governance/management by high ranking executives. Extending previous conceptualizations and 
definitions of the top management team (Wiersema and Bantel 1992), we define executive as the organizational 
collective team consisting of the firm’s CEO, CFO, and other senior management officers, such as COO and other 
Executive Vice Presidents. Although the CIO is part of the executive team in many organizations, we exclude the 
CIO from this group in our study to avoid double counting. We view the presence of a CIO as an IT governance 
mechanism, as discussed next.  
CIO  
The CIO is uniquely positioned to devise and implement a vision of the role of IT in furthering business strategies. 
Earl (1989) suggests that the CIO’s combination of technical and business knowledge, in particular, are essential to 
innovation success. One of the primary motivations for creating the CIO position is to establish an IT designated 
peer who is more likely to be accepted by the inner circle of the firm’s leadership (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 
1999; Earl 1996; Ross and Feeny 2000).  The CIO is also the chief executive of the IT function and thus can fashion 
the IT management effectively.  An effective IT management capability is positively related to a firm’s extent of IT 
use (Boynton et al. 1994).  Furthermore, the announcements of newly created CIO positions are likely to have a 
positive signaling effect on the market (Chatterjee et al. 2001). Since CIOs need to grasp the bigger picture 
including contract management, asset life cycles, and discretionary spending by IT staff, the more experienced the 
CIO, the more likely (s)he can better manage IT project priorities and IT governance. In essence, the experience of a 
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CIO may not only help ensure that IT strategy is aligned with the company’s overall business strategy, but also 
efficiently and effectively help avoiding IT risks and maximizing benefits.  
In addition, since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the U.S.A. and the mandatory internal 
control audit under SOX 404, CIOs have had to sub-certify IT controls over financial reporting to CFOs and CEOs 
to enable them to comply with their certification responsibilities. For organizations with CIOs, such certification 
would be much easier and less expensive than for organizations without such governance mechanisms; for example, 
Canada et al. (2006) show that audit costs for companies with IT weaknesses are dramatically higher than for 
companies without such weaknesses. CIOs and other IT governance mechanisms can contribute to the elimination of 
IT weaknesses and overall improvements in financial performance through the reduction of compliance and audit 
costs. 
IT strategy committee 
According to the IT Governance Institute, (ITGI 2003) the IT Strategy Committee is an essential element of an 
effective IT governance model. The IT strategy committee is a mechanism that contributes to the alignment of IT 
and business strategy and the prioritization and control of major IT projects. An effective IT strategy committee can 
contribute to both revenue growth and cost containment through effective IT strategy and avoidance of costly 
project failures. Nolan (2004) advocates the use of such committees to compensate for the IT knowledge and 
attention deficit at the board, while Nolan and McFarlan (2005) suggest that such committees help top management 
and the board drive technology decisions. However, De Haes and Van Grembergen (2005) find that the IT strategy 
committee did not enable more thorough and continuous involvement of the board in IT governance.  
The following hypotheses flow from the above discussion:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with more top managers and board members with IT knowledge are more likely to have 
effective IT governance, in the form of (1a) an IT strategy committee and (1b) a CIO, than firms with less IT 
knowledge at the top executive ranks and board level.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with better IT governance (in the form of (2a) an IT strategy committee and (2b) a CIO have 
higher levels of financial performance (i.e., return on assets, return on sales, and growth rate) than firms without 
such governance. 
Hypothesis 3: After adjusting for prior financial performance, the average financial performance of firms that 
have effective IT governance mechanisms are higher than the average financial performance of all other firms in 
the industry in subsequent years. 
 
Method 
Samples and test variables 
We have identified a unique data set of 84 US public companies1 that employed an important IT governance 
mechanism, the IT strategy committee in 2004. Following the recommendation of Srinivasan (2005) and Desai et al. 
(2006), we create a matched sample of 84 public companies based on industry membership (SIC industry code) and 
size (revenue) by using the Compustat database to identify such companies and financial data in 2004. We were able 
to match 58% of the firms with an IT strategy committee in the same four-digit SIC code, the rest are matched at the 
three- or two- digit SIC levels. The p-value for the mean difference of revenue is 0.543. The above procedures yield 
our final sample: 84 firms with an IT strategy committee (ITSTRAT) matched with 84 firms without an IT strategy 
committee (NOSTRAT).   
1 The Corporate Library conducted its analysis for Tapestry Networks on June 9, 2006, on a database of 2,143 public 
firms that it follows. 
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Table 1 summarizes the industry distribution of the 84 firms with IT strategy committee. As table 1 shows, some 
codes were overrepresented in the sample relative to others. The 84 firms with an IT strategy committee cover 25 
codes in eight industry groups. Among them, the machinery, electronic, and other equipment industry has the 
highest number of companies with an IT strategy committee, followed by the construction and manufacturing 
industry, then by finance, insurance and real estate industry. The generalizeability of our findings may be limited to 
the codes actually represented in the sample. 
[Insert Table 1] 
For all 168 companies we obtained information on the IT knowledge possessed by top management by reading and 
coding the Form 10K and 8K proxy documents filed by the companies that contain information on their executives’ 
backgrounds on the SEC’s Edgar database and Lexis-Nexis searches. One of the authors and two research assistants 
independently categorized the IT knowledge of the executives and board members. We employ two criteria to 
measure IT knowledge: 1) whether the person has IT-related college degrees or 2) whether the person has previously 
worked in a public IT firm. For example, the proxy documents of Cadence Design Systems Inc. contained the 
following descriptions for two of its top five executives: 
Michael J. Fister has served as President and Chief Executive Officer of Cadence since May 2004. Prior to 
joining Cadence Design Systems Inc (CDNS), Mr. Fister spent 17 years at Intel Corporation, where he was 
most recently Senior Vice President and General Manager of the company's Enterprise Platforms Group. Mr. 
Fister is a graduate of the University of Cincinnati where he received a B.S. and M.S. in electrical 
engineering. Mr. Fister also serves as a director of Autodesk, Inc. 
WILLIAM PORTER has served as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Cadence since 
May 1999. From 1994 to 1999, Mr. Porter served as Vice President, Corporate Controller and Assistant 
Secretary of Cadence. Prior to joining Cadence, Mr. Porter served as Technical Accounting and Reporting 
Manager and as Controller of Cupertino Operations with Apple Computer, Inc. Mr. Porter is a director of 
Onyx Software Corporation. 
Each of the above two descriptions would have earned a point for the company’s MGMTIT variable that is meant to 
measure the IT knowledge of top executives, excluding the CIO. Using this approach we created two test variables: 
MGMTIT, BOARDIT. MGMTIT is the percentage of top executives (except a CIO) with IT knowledge. BOARDIT 
is the percentage of independent directors with IT knowledge. A third variable, CIO, is set to 1 if a firm has a CIO 
position, 0 otherwise. At the end of the coding process, the three coders met to reconcile differences and arrived at a 
consensus. Inter-rater coding reliability, the percentage agreement between the three coders, was 94%.  
Based upon recent studies of the determinants of internal control on financial performance, we control for the effects 
of known factors that are associated with financial performance of a firm: financial condition (LEVERAGE, LOSS, 
and ARINVEN) and business complexity (SEGMENT) (Doyle et al. 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2005; Li et al. 
2006). In addition, we also include an indicator variable to capture governance effects related to having a CEO that 
also serves as the chairman of the board (CEOCHAIR), since prior studies provide evidence that CEO chairs 
negatively affect the board’s monitoring function, although the results are not consistent (Alexander et al.1993; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Li et al. 2006). 
[Insert Table 2] 
Proposed models  
Hypothesis 1: Benchmark for comparison  
H1 tests for a positive association between the IT knowledge of top management (e.g. executives, board members) 
and the adoption of an IT strategy committee. We use two variables to proxy for the IT knowledge of top 
management: MGMTIT, BOARDIT. In addition, we include the IT governance variable CIO as a control. Other 
control variables are drawn from prior literature on determinants of internal control on financial performance (Doyle 
et al. 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2005; Li et al. 2006). The logistic regression model for testing H1 is:  
 
ITSTRAT=β0+β1MGMTIT+β2BOARDIT+β3CIO+β4CEOCHAIR+β5LEVERAGE+β6LOSS+β7ARINVEN+ 
β8SEGMENT+e                (1) 
In addition, for firms with an IT strategy committee, the difference between the performance of the sampling firm 
and the median performance of all firms with the corresponding (two and four digit) SIC codes is computed and 
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analyzed. Both the Wilcoxon signed-ranked test and the parametric t-test were used to test the significance of 
differences. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Adjusting for prior financial performance (or self-selection bias) 
Kambil and Lucas (2002) and Nolan and McFarlan (2005) state that the selection of IT experts is more likely in 
better managed firms which are less prone to IT problems. Hence, firms may appoint IT experts to their IT strategy 
committee to signal their better IT management and provide stakeholders with assurances about the firm’s IT 
strategic capabilities. Indeed, we would expect that firms selecting to disclose their IT strategy committee would be 
most likely to experience the greatest gains from a self-selection bias. To mitigate this bias, we run a model 
predicting those that will most benefit from adopting (ADP) IT strategy committee in equation (1) below:   
ADP (0,1) = β0 + β1ROS-1 + β2SGA-1 + β3GR-1 +  β4LNSIZE-1+ e
ADP (0,1) = β0 + β1ROA-1 + β2SGA-1 + β3GR-1 +  β4LNSIZE-1+ e equation (1) 
This analysis allows us to assess the extent that prior performance affects the adoption of IT strategy committee and 
generate the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman 1979) to control for self selection bias in the subsequent tests (Chaney et 
al. 2004; Santhanam and Hartono 2003; Hogan 1997; Brown and Perry 1994; Lim et al. 2007). The analysis 
suggests that firms that adopt their IT strategy committee have been previously profitable (ROA-1 and ROS-1) and 
growing (GR-1). Using these results and the inverse Mills ratio, we control for a firm’s choosing to adopt the IT 
strategy committee with the variable IMR (inverse Mills ratio).  
H2 specifically tests the effects of IT Knowledge on the form of IT Governance that eventually affects firm 
performance. Profitability is arguably the most important criterion for evaluating the performance of a firm. Our 
measure of firm profitability is return on sales (ROS) and return on assets (ROA)2 (Dehning et al. 2007; Smith et al. 
1998; Mitra and Chaya 1996). In addition, we use a direct measure of a firm’s current growth rate (GR) that is 
measured as the percent change in sales from one year to the next calculated by dividing net sales by the inventory, 
accounts receivable, and total assets (Smith et al. 1998; Brown et al. 1995).  The cross sectional regression model for 
testing H2 is:  
 
FP =β0+β1MGMTIT+β2BOARDIT+β3CIO+β4CEOCHAIR+β5LEVERAGE+β6LOSS+β7ARINVEN+ 
β8SEGMENT+ β9IMR+e                 (2) 
 
To provide further insight into the implications of the self-selection issue, we adopt two stage “treatment effects” 
procedure of Heckman (1979). In the first state, we use the parameter estimates from equation (2) to compute 
inverse Mills ratios (IMR). In the second stage, we construct a regression model that explains the variation in 
financial performance. The following analysis tests the change in the statistical significance among variables, with 
the inclusion of IMR because the significance of IMR itself would yield useful inferences on the importance of 
controlling for self-selection bias that examine the impact of IT strategy committee on financial performance.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Testing for lag effects of IT governance mechanisms 
To test hypothesis 3, data for the same set of firms including firms with an IT strategy committee and control firms 
were utilized. Researchers have emphasized that IT investments are made with long-term goals and there is a time 
lag in obtaining benefits (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Weill and Olson 1989). The lack of time-lagged studies could 
be one possible reason for the inconsistencies among studies linking IT investments to firm performance (Chan 
2000; Devaraj and Kohli 2000; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996). Despite these assertions, very few studies test the 
sustained effects of IT investments (Nahmood and Mann 2000), IT capability (Santhanam and Hartono, 2003) and 
IT innovation (Lim et al. 2007). Using the same logic, we expect that firms with an IT strategy committee and a CIO 
that are identified as having top management (e.g. executives, board members) with superior IT knowledge in 2004, 
will provide evidence on the sustained effects of superior IT governance mechanisms when their performance is 
compared to their within-industry competitors for the period 2005-2006, after adjusting for prior performance 
 
2 ROA results not shown for brevity.  All results are similar to ROS results. 
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(similar to the test for hypothesis 2).  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
Univariate statistics for all main and control variables used in empirical tests can be found in Table 33. These 
support our first hypothesis H1:  Firms with more top managers and board members with IT knowledge are more 
likely to have effective IT governance, in the form of (1a) an IT strategy committee and (1b) a CIO, than firms 
with less IT knowledge at the top executive ranks and board level.  
 In other words, firms without an IT strategy committee have fewer executives with IT-related experience, have a 
lower number of board members with IT experience, and have fewer CIOs.  However, firms with an IT strategy 
committee are more likely to have CEOs serving as the chairman of the board, are less leveraged, report less losses, 
and are less likely to have organizational restructuring.   
[Insert Table 3] 
Correlations between the variables employed in the empirical tests can be found in Table 4.  The presence of an IT 
strategy committee is positively associated with MGMTIT, BOARDIT, CIO, CEOCHAIR, and negatively 
associated with LEVERAGE, LOSS, and RESTRUCTURE. None of the correlations are above 0.298, and the 
highest variance inflation factor (VIF) in our regression is only 1.981, which is well below the suggested 
multicollinearity problem threshold of 10 (Marquandt 1980; Gujarati 1995). Our examination of the standard errors 
and size of the coefficient also shows that they are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the highly correlated 
variables, indicating multicollinearity is unlikely to be problematic (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Thus, the results 
of collinearity diagnostics (for models) indicate that multi-collinearity is unlikely to be a problem.           
[Insert Table 4] 
Test of Hypothesis 1: Logistic regression analysis for Models (1)  
Table 5 summarizes the findings of our logistic regression analysis for hypothesis H1. Analyses are conducted based 
upon the full sample of 84 firms including 84 test (with IT strategy committee) firms and 84 control (no IT strategy 
committee) firms. The model (1) is highly significant (p-values < 0.001) with good explanatory power (pseudo R2 =
0.592). The model (1) tests the impact of IT knowledge at the executive ranks, the board, and the existence of a CIO 
on the presence of an IT strategy committee. In model (1), with ITSTRAT as the dependent variable, all testing 
variables (MGMTIT, BOARDIT, and CIO) have positive coefficients, which are statistically significant at p=0.05. 
In other words, firms with more IT-knowledgeable top executives, board members, and employing CIOs are more 
likely to have an IT strategy committee, which supports our hypothesis H1. For control variables, firms with CEOs 
serving as the chairman of the board, with higher leverage, lower growth rates, and those experiencing restructures, 
are less likely to have an IT strategy committee.    
 [Insert Table 5] 
 
Test of Hypothesis 2: Results from a single-stage and two-stage regression analyses 
Table 6 summarizes the findings of our regression analysis for Model (2).  Model (2) tests the net impact of IT 
governance mechanisms on financial performance after taking into account the impact of the IT knowledge factors. 
For ROA as the measure of financial performance, model (3) is highly significant (p-values < 0.001) with good 
explanatory power (adj. R2 = 0.552; 0.547) for single-stage and two-stage analyses, respectively. Overall, Table 6 
shows that financial performance as measured by ROA, ROS and Growth is associated with the presence of IT 
governance mechanisms at (p<0.10) compared to companies without such mechanisms, after taking into account the 
influence of the IT knowledge of executives and board members, and the presence of CIOs. The strongest effects in 
this analysis are those for CIO presence and top management’s IT knowledge. 
 
3 This descriptive statistic is for untruncated data. When we truncate all variables at the 99th (1st) percentiles, the 
results of our hypotheses tests remain the same. 
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In Table 6, the first two columns list the independent variables for this analysis and the expected relationship of 
these variables with financial performance (FP). Table 6 first reports the results based on single-stage estimation of 
the financial performance model that does not control for the self-selection of IT strategy committee (Model 1). 
Consistent with the hypothesis 2, we find that MGMTIT, BOARDIT, and CIO are significantly and positively 
related to financial performance (p=0.05) in Model 2. Consistent with prior research, a large number of control 
variable are also significantly related to FP in the predicted direction. Next, we report the results from the regression 
of FP on the explanatory variables based on a two-stage estimation procedure (equation 1), which includes the IMR 
from stage one as a control for self-selection bias. The results indicate that IMR is positively related to FP (at the 10 
percent level). Furthermore, under this model specification, the statistical significance of the relationships between 
all explanatory variables and FP is weakened after controlling for self-selection bias (p<0.10). These findings 
highlight the importance of controlling for self-selection bias when investigating the association between IT 
governance mechanism and financial performance as regressions that fail to account for the self-selection bias will 
yield biased results. The results for the control variables are similar to those reported for Model 1.  
 [Insert Table 6] 
Test of Hypothesis 3: Results for lag effect 
Table 7 presents the results of matched sample comparison procedures with control firms at the specific SIC code. 
The results indicate that the FP is significantly higher when compared to the industry averages in all cases when the 
regression analysis is used in 2005 and 2006, respectively. When industry average based on both four and two digit 
SIC code are used, the results indicate significantly better financial performance by firms with IT strategy committee 
during the two years after they employ an IT strategy committee. These effects are most pronounced in the second 
year (e.g. 2006) where significant effects are observed for performance measures. Similar to the results observed for 
current effects of IT governance mechanisms, the analysis for sustained effects also showed some variability 
depending on the benchmark firms used for comparison. In both cases, the results are generally stronger when 
control firms are matched with firms with IT strategy committee at the two digit level, which is consistent with 
Santhanam et al. (2003). 
[Insert Table 7] 
Conclusion 
Discussion of results 
We find that IT knowledge at top executive levels and the board is associated with a company’s use of IT 
governance mechanisms such as CIOs and IT strategy committees. IT knowledge of executives is more strongly 
associated with these mechanisms and financial performance than board members’ IT knowledge, but even so, the 
association that exists suggests that board member IT knowledge is valuable.  
These results are noteworthy because articles in the business press have questioned the perceived value of CIOs and 
how welcome they are on boards (McCue 2005). Research by public relations company Burson-Marsteller (2005) 
indicates that only about eight percent of organizations have CIOs on the board. They label this a boardroom 
competency deficit. However, a Deloitte (2006) survey found that more than 50% of boards have three or more 
members knowledgeable in IT, with only 8% having no members with IT knowledge. Thus, our results suggest that 
CIO involvement at the board level may not always be required to have IT represented at the boardroom table. 
Consistent with the Deloitte (2006) survey, our findings indicate that non-CIO executives and board members often 
have IT expertise and that expertise is associated with better IT governance and better financial performance. 
We also find that IT governance mechanisms such as CIOs and IT strategy committees are associated with better 
financial performance. CIO presence is more strongly associated with stronger financial performance, but the IT 
strategy committee is significant at (p<.10) for all three measures of financial performance for both 2004 and 2005.  
The contingency view of the potential for such benefits would predict that not all companies’ boards would need to 
be involved in IT governance.  Therefore, not all companies would benefit equally from implementing board-level 
IT governance mechanisms.  Nolan and McFarlan (2005) use a 2X2 grid to identify companies that would be most 
likely to benefit from board-level IT governance initiatives (i.e., those where IT serves a “strategic” role) and those 
least likely (i.e., those where IT serves a “support” role).  Those where IT serves a “factory” role or a “turnaround” 
role would fall between those two extremes.  We propose to test this contingency view in an extension of this study 
by using industry groupings as proxies for the four roles of IT proposed by Nolan and McFarlan (2005). 
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Limitations 
A potential limitation of our study is that our sample is limited to industries with at least one company with an IT 
strategy committee. Other industry categories are omitted in our sample, resulting in a potential limitation in the 
generalizability of our findings. Another limitation of our study is that it demonstrates an association between IT 
knowledge, IT governance mechanisms and financial performance but not causation. Thus, it could be that 
companies with better financial performance can and do afford more effective IT governance, rather than more IT 
knowledge and more effective IT governance leading to better financial performance. However, why would 
companies invest in IT governance unnecessarily? Still another limitation is that we do not extend our tests to the 
impact of IT governance on the company’s market value. Although there should be a positive relationship between 
better financial performance and market value, our investigation does not demonstrate this relationship. This is a 
project for future research.  
Contributions 
Our study examines whether IT knowledge and IT governance mechanisms, where they exist, are associated with an 
entity’s financial performance. If they are, then normative prescriptions would rest on more solid foundations. 
Business leaders could be more certain that investments in IT knowledge and IT governance mechanisms would pay 
off, or at least would not undermine financial performance.  
We have identified a unique data set of companies that employ an important IT governance mechanism, the IT 
strategy committee. We created a matched sample of companies based on industry membership and size. In addition, 
we obtained information on the IT knowledge possessed by top management by reading and coding the proxy 
documents filed by the companies that contain information on their executives’ and board members’ backgrounds.  
Once created, this data set could be used for additional future research. For example, in our sample companies IT 
knowledge on the part of management and the board and mechanisms such as the IT strategy committee and CIO 
play a significant role in connection with the companies’ financial performance. Possible extensions of this study 
would include comparing all the companies in each of the industry groups in our sample and comparing our sample 
companies to companies in other SIC codes. 
We find that companies in our sample have a comparatively small number of material internal control weaknesses 
and even fewer material IT control weaknesses identified by Sarbanes-Oxley 404 audits4. It would be interesting to 
investigate the reason for this and, particularly, the effects of IT governance mechanisms and IT knowledge on IT 
control weakness. 
In summary, our findings for three different financial performance measures and two years show a significant 
positive association between IT knowledge on the part of top executives, the use of effective IT governance 
mechanisms such as an IT strategy committee and a CIO and better financial performance. 
 
4 The Sarbanes-Oxley 404 Act (SOX) has been enacted in the United States to improve corporate responsibility, 
through measures that strengthen internal controls and ultimately increase accountability. 
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Industry # % Two-
digit 
SIC 
Industry # % 


















Hardware, Garden Supply, 
And Mobile Home Dealers 
1 0.6 
28 
Chemicals And Allied 
Products 
16 9.4 
54 Food Stores 
1 0.6 











Electronic And Other 





Security And Commodity 
Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, 
And Services 
1 0.6 





Medical And Optical 




Insurance Agents, Brokers, 
And Service 
1 0.6 
45 Transportation By Air 
1 0.6 
67 
Holding And Other 
Investment Offices 
1 0.6 
48 Communications 3 1.8 73 Business Services 5 2.9 
49 
Electric, Gas, And 
Sanitary Services 
2 1.2 




Research, Management, And 
Related Services 
3 1.8 
Table 2 Variable Descriptions 
Hypothesis Variable Expected 
Sign 
Definition 
MGMTIT + Percentage of top executives (excluding CIO) with IT-related experience. 
BOARDIT + Percentage of independent directors with IT-related experience. 
CIO - 1 If a firm has a CIO position, 0 otherwise. 
Control CEOCHAIR ? 1 if the CEO also chairs the board of directors. 
Control LEVERAGE - Total liabilities divided by total assets. 
Control LOSS - 1 if net income is negative, 0 otherwise. 
Control ARINVEN - Total accounts receivables and total inventories divided by total assets. 
Control SEGMENT - Natural logarithm of the number of firms’ reportable segments. 
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Table 3 Univariate Analysis  
 ITSTRAT NOSTRAT t-statistics p-value 
84 84   
MGMTIT 0.648 0.141 3.649 0.000** 
BOARDIT 0.803 0.768 2.657 0.003** 
CIO 2.321 0.936 3.986 0.000** 
CEOCHAIR 0.603 0.497 1.997 0.042* 
LEVERAGE 0.397 0.842 4.012 0.000** 
LOSS 0.219 0.502 3.235 0.002** 
ARINVEN 0.289 0.294 0.613 0.542 
SEGMENT 2.45 2.789 1.326 0.149 
P-values are for two-tailed tests of significance (** significant at the 0.01; * significant at the 0.05; $ significant at the 0.1) 
ITSTRAT: Firms with IT strategy committee. 
NOSTRAT: Firms without IT strategy committee. 
IT Governance Characteristics and Control Variables defined in Table 2. 
 
Table 4 Correlations  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ITSTRAT 1
MGMTIT 0.277        
p-value 0.000**        
BOARDIT 0.056 0.208       
p-value 0.264 0.002**       
CIO 0.265 0.143 0.186      
p-value 0.000** 0.034 0.006**      
CEOCHAIR 0.145 -0.036 0.070 0.005     
p-value 0.031* 0.600 0.300 0.945     
LEVERAGE -0.256 -0.008 -0.201 -0.115 0.046    
p-value 0.000** 0.904 0.003** 0.089$ 0.495    
LOSS -0.191 -0.116 0.009 0.030 0.006 0.052   
p-value 0.004** 0.085$ 0.893 0.657 0.931 0.446   
ARINVEN 0.039 -0.117 -0.110 -0.094 -0.055 -0.021 -0.236  
p-value 0.564 0.082$ 0.104$ 0.165 0.415 0.757 0.000**  
SEGMENT -0.101 0.002 -0.140 0.006 -0.076 0.068 -0.105 -0.072 
p-value 0.135 0.975 0.038* 0.924 0.263 0.314 0.122 0.286 
P-values are for two-tailed tests of significance (** significant at the 0.01; * significant at the 0.05; $ significant at the 0.1) 
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Table 5 Logistic regression analysis 
 
ITSTRAT=β0+β1MGMTIT+β2BOARDIT+β3CIO+β4CEOCHAIR+β5LEVERAGE+β6LOSS+β7ARINVEN+ 
β8SEGMENT+e                (1) 
Model (1) 
coefficient p-value 
CONSTANT 2.43 0.287 
MGMTIT 1.319 0.027* 
BOARDIT 1.014 0.038* 
CIO 1.474 0.012* 
CEOCHAIR 0.854 0.062$ 
LEVERAGE -2.324 0.000** 
LOSS -0.405 0.582 
ARINVEN 0.639 0.514 
SEGMENT -0.048 0.726 
ITSTRAT predicted correctly 78% 
NOSTRAT predicted correctly 76% 
Model Chi-Square (sig.) 132.179 
Pseudo R2 0.592 
P-values are for two-tailed tests of significance (** significant at the 0.01; * significant at the 0.05; $ significant at the 0.1) 
 
ITSTRAT: Firms with IT strategy committee. 
NOSTRAT: Firms without IT strategy committee. 
 IT Governance Characteristics and Control Variables defined in Table 2. 
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Table 6 Regression Analysis 
 
FP =β0+β1MGMTIT+β2BOARDIT+β3CIO+β4CEOCHAIR+β5LEVERAGE+β6LOSS+β7ARINVEN+ 
β8SEGMENT+ β9IMR+e                (2) 
 
2004  Single-stage Two-stage Single-stage Two-stage Single-stage Two-stage 
ROA_04 ROA_04 ROS_04 ROS_04 GR_04 GR_04 Predicted 
sign Beta t-stat.   Beta t-stat. Beta t-stat. Beta t-stat. Beta t-stat. 
CONSTANT  1.127  1.102  1.071  1.065  0.059  0.041 
MGMTIT + 0.549 2.256* 0.541 2.221* 0.514 1.957* 0.497 1.948* 0.499 1.881$ 0.486 1.867$ 
BOARDIT + 0.439 1.808$ 0.426 1.786$ 0.262 1.683 0.231 1.647 0.543 0.920 0.521 0.874 
CIO + 0.587 2.804* 0.573 2.786* 0.645 2.252* 0.633 2.147* 0.496 1.775$ 0.491 1.770$ 
CEOCHAIR Control 0.034 0.841 0.033 0.839 0.053 0.866 0.043 0.782 0.017 0.346 0.015 0.298 
LEVERAGE Control -0.387 -4.132** -0.379 -4.121** -0.363 -3.996** -0.341 -3.521** -0.274 -2.675** -0.264 -2.582** 
LOSS Control -0.113 -2.478* -0.102 -2.381* -0.144 -2.165* -0.136 -1.987* -0.129 -1.879* -0.113 -1.664$ 
ARINVEN Control 0.035 0.694 0.031 0.682 0.053 0.566 0.047 0.523 0.068 0.797 0.051 0.821 
SEGMENT Control -0.018 -0.461 -0.017 -0.457 -0.023 -0.486 -0.020 -0.479 -0.035 -0.344 -0.026 -0.289 
IMR Control   0.123 1.678$   0.116 1.548$  0.101 1.184 
F-Stat. (sig.) 25.542 (0.000)** 24.891(0.000)** 22.843 (0.000)** 21.245(0.000)** 18.512 (0.000)** 17.982 (0.000)** 
Adj. R2 0.552 0.547 0.524 0.517 0.494 0.485 
P-values are for two-tailed tests of significance (** significant at the 0.01; * significant at the 0.05; $ significant at the 0.1) 
 
ITSTRAT: Firms with IT strategy committee. 
NOSTRAT: Firms without IT strategy committee. 
 IT Governance Characteristics and Control Variables defined in Table 2. 
IMR: inverse mill ratio from the estimation of equation (1). 
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ROA_05 A 0.564** 0.602**  
B 0.005 0.576** 0.070$ 
ROS_05 A 0.537** 0.579**  
B 0.007 0.557** 0.062$ 
GR_05 A 0.521** 0.564**  
B 0.012 0.521** 0.058$ 
2006 Model 
ROA_06 A 0.028* 0.167*  
B 0.113** 0.086 0.216** 
ROS_06 A 0.031* 0.173*  
B 0.041** 0.098 0.197** 
GR_06 A 0.154* 0.167**  
B 0.022 0.153** 0.134* 
P-values are for two-tailed tests of significance (** significant at the 0.01; * significant at the 0.05; $ significant at the 0.1) 
 
Model A: (Performance measure for year t) = f(performance measure for year t-1) 
Model B: (Perforamnce measure for year t) = f(performance measure for year t-1, category: 1 if firms with IT 
strategy committee (ITSTRAT), 0 if Firms without IT strategy committee (NOSTRAT). 
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